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 In this paper, I challenge criticisms concerning the moral use of anger in recent debates. 
Recently criticisms have emerged claiming that anger either always carries with it an irrational 
desire or that anger causes one to habituate negative character traits. I challenge the conception 
of anger which leads to these objections by appealing to our common notions and intuitions 
concerning the emotion. I then provide an account of anger as a desire to overcome impediments 
to our general well-being with a focus on human dignity. I argue that my account of anger does 
not fall victim to these criticism and conclude that the emotion of anger properly constrained can 
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In this paper, I argue that the emotion of anger is necessary to properly navigate the 
moral landscape in everyday interactions and thus can be a morally praiseworthy emotion. I will 
challenge both Stoic and Buddhist critics of anger who claim that anger is irrational and causes 
one to habituate immoral character traits. I will present my argument in opposition to recent 
work in the philosophy of moral emotions and in particular against Martha Nussbaum’s account 
in her 2015 book, Anger and Forgiveness1. 
I argue that the Traditional Account of anger, as articulated by Martha Nussbaum fails to 
account for anger towards amoral obstacles, anger’s role in education, and perhaps most 
importantly, for the way we use anger to address injustice. Nussbaum argues that anger is 
irrational and cannot be used in a morally praiseworthy manner. However, this is true only if her 
account of anger is correct. I will provide an account of anger as a desire to overcome various 
kinds of impediments to our well-being; which I argue can make sense of anger’s use in these 
areas. By the end of this paper I hope to show that anger is not only a morally permissible, but 
even a praiseworthy way of addressing tangible harms; such as those found in response to cases 
of serious harm. This will provide an argument against the Stoic criticism of anger as irrational.  
In response to Buddhist critics of anger, I hold that anger does not necessarily cause one 
to habituate negative character traits. In the background of my view is the idea that a fully human 
moral agent would, in some important sense, be capable of anger and that it is morally 
appropriate to become angry in some contexts.  An inability to feel a morally appropriate 
                                                          




emotional response, like anger, in some situations, would count as a morally blameworthy 
character defect. 
Section 1: Traditional Anger 
 In this paper, the ‘Traditional Account’ of anger will refer to the account of anger given 
by Nussbaum in Chapter 2 of her book, Anger and Forgiveness, which she adopts from her 
reading of Aristotle’s traditional definition in the rhetoric: “a desire accompanied by pain for an 
imagined retribution on account of an imagined slighting inflicted by people who have no 
legitimate reason to slight oneself or one’s own” (Rhetoric 1378a31-33)2.  Nussbaum holds that 
anger involves a “double movement, from pain inflicted to striking back” (pg. 21).  Essentially, 
anger is a responsive emotion that seeks to address some perceived present bad to obtain a 
perceived future good. To understand and interpret Aristotle’s account, Nussbaum attempts to 
define the two key concepts: Retribution and slighting/injury. 
Nussbaum defines retribution as “…a wish for things to go badly, somehow, for the 
offender, in a way that is envisaged, somehow, however vaguely, as a payback for the offense.” 
This could range from wishing for the relationship of an ex to go badly, to wishing for jail time 
for one’s offender (23). By using the word ‘payback’ in her definition, Nussbaum is appealing to 
the idea of paying back a debt: Referring to debt’s ability to be assuaged by the debtor paying 
what is owed. Nussbaum argues that the Traditional Account treats the harm involved in 
‘slighting’ as one that can be assuaged through punishment. Retribution’s ability to address 
harms will depend on the account of slighting/injury that we adopt. To define ‘slighting’, 
Nussbaum analyzes the case of rape (23). She argues that there are two ways we can view the 
                                                          
2 Rhetoric, 1378a31-33, Cited in Nussbaum 2015 
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harms involved; either as the tangible physical, psychological, and emotional harms (29) or as a 
down-ranking of societal status (28). 
Nussbaum is certainly correct that there is a strong historical connection between the idea 
of anger at injustice and a desire for the other to suffer. Nussbaum argues that there is an 
aesthetic pleasure tied to this idea of revenge; that we enjoy stories where the villain gets what’s 
coming to them (25). I have no doubt that she is correct about this. Take for instance our love for 
the story of Helen of Troy in the Iliad, or the enjoyment of Edmund Dante in The Count of 
Monte Cristo at the thought of his revenge when he says: “How did I escape? With difficulty. 
How did I plan this moment? With pleasure.” However, is this historic connection enough for us 
to accept that the desire found in Traditional Account of anger is found in every expression and 
feeling of anger?  
 Nussbaum holds that this desire for retribution is irrational in most cases of anger. In 
anger against amoral objects, such as broken computers, it wrongly attributes intentions to said 
objects. In educational anger a desire for revenge is irrational as the goal of education is to better 
other individuals. The irrationality of anger in cases of justice requires a more complicated 
explanation that I will get to shortly. For now, It is enough to say that for Nussbaum anger 
against injustice is either Lex Talionis based revenged or it is a mislabeling of tangible harms as 
societal downranking; Both of which are irrational.  
Nussbaum’s challenge to the Traditional Account is a modern version of the Stoic 
criticism of anger. Seneca held that anger is not an essential part of human nature (rationality) 
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and thus we can make ourselves to live without it. (De Ira 1,5)3. For Seneca humans are naturally 
rational, and rationality, being self-discipline, exists in opposition to the passions which are 
uncontrolled reactions to situations (De Ira 1,7). Nussbaum, continuing this tradition, suggest 
that anger is a desire for a goal which is fundamentally irrational. Her solution to this problem is 
to move to what she calls Transition Anger which is akin to the Buddhist Kuruna (Compassion). 
Thus, she aligns her view with the Buddhist criticisms of anger. The traditional Buddhist 
criticism is that anger forms bad character traits and we can avoid these traits by adopting the 
emotion of compassion as a way of addressing the same concerns as anger. I hold that these 
objections only work if we adopt the Traditional Account of anger as the true account of the 
emotion. However, there are many cases where our anger does not seem irrational, which cannot 
be accounted for by the Traditional Account.  
 
Section 2: Challenging the Traditional Conception of Anger as Presented in Recent Philosophical 
Debates 
 
2.1: Amoral Targets of Anger 
 Amoral targets are targets independent of moral consideration which impede our ability 
to accomplish our goals.  When we experience anger in our everyday lives, it seems that our 
anger is commonly directed towards targets which are independent of moral consideration. For 
example, we get angry at our computers if they run slowly or fail to save a file, we get angry at 
                                                          




our cars when they do not start in the morning, we get angry if there is ice on our car windows 
when we need to leave for work; and so on. What can the Traditional Account of anger say about 
such cases? 
The Traditional Account paints anger as a desire for suffering on part of the target who 
has wronged us. Such a desire directed towards an inanimate object makes no sense insofar as it 
is not the type of thing which can be made to suffer. Nussbaum argues that when we get angry at 
tools we are irrationally treating them as agents with a function towards us they are refusing to 
fulfill (19). On the Traditional Account, anger in these cases is not distinct from anger towards 
moral agents. We are simply acting irrationally when we get angry towards our cars. One thing 
to note about Nussbaum’s suggestion is that seeing my car as something with a function for me it 
is refusing to fulfill does not require me to believe it is the type of thing that can suffer. Instead, 
only that it is the type of thing which has intentions. Obviously, such a belief is still rationally 
ungrounded. However, it is worth noting that even if Nussbaum is correct this is not evidence 
that my anger towards it is a desire for suffering on its part.  
What is the desire I have towards my car in such cases? It seems to be that my desire is 
for my car to do its job. My desire does not require assigning intentionality to my car. In cases of 
anger towards other moral agents there is a close association of anger and blameworthiness 
(Quigley and Tedeschi, 1996)4. When we become angry towards an agent it also seems we 
assign blame to the agent. Nussbaum notes that in cases where we realize the target of our anger 
                                                          
4 Quigley, Brian M., and James T. Tedeschi. “Mediating Effects of Blame Attributions on Feelings of 
Anger.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, vol. 22, no. 12, 1996, pp. 1280–1288. 
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is not blameworthy our anger is often assuaged (18). Does anger always require that we assign 
wrongdoing or blameworthiness to the source of our anger? 
Recently, David Shoemaker (2018)5 has defended the position that there are two distinct 
types of anger: “One type of anger moves us to overcome or eliminate the source of some 
blockage. The other moves us to confront or retaliate against someone”. I disagree with 
Shoemaker’s view that these are two different types of anger at play. However, I believe he is 
right to say that there are two distinct roles being played by anger.  
Anger aimed at eliminating the source of a blockage does not necessarily entail that I 
believe the blockage to be the product of some type of wrongdoing. Take for instance when we 
get angry, not at objects like my car, but at situations. For example, when we find ice on our car 
windows in the morning, preventing us from getting to work. Unlike tools, we do not assume 
nature has a functional role that it performs relative to our needs. It is unreasonable to assume 
that, in every case of anger concerned with natural obstacles, we have such an elaborate 
irrational belief. A more reasonable explanation would be that we simply get angry at obstacles 
to our goals and that our desire in such cases is not retribution but to overcome the obstacle we 
face. 
However, even in the cases of ice on our windows Nussbaum may be able to argue that 
we are making a mistake; what she calls the narcissistic error (29). The narcissistic error is 
caused when we have such unreasonable view of our own self-worth that we think anything we 
perceive as ‘bad’ is an insult intentionally committed upon us. Might we be doing that in the 
                                                          




‘ice’ case? If we were to adopt the account of vices given by Evagrius Ponticus, it may be argued 
that anger at the ice is a matter of pride. Ponticus argued that pride often leads us to anger at the 
divine because of a naïve view about our own worth (Harmless and Fitzgerald, 2001: Skem 40-
56)6.  
From this naïve position of worth, the ice is viewed as God’s or the universe’s failure to 
live up to its duties or responsibilities regarding us. However, this is quite a perverse form of 
pride. Obviously, a perverse sense of worth might cause us to desire retribution in cases where 
such desires are irrational (e.g. wanting God to suffer because we dislike the snow). However, to 
assert that we are doing this every time we get angry about obstacles in our path requires 
empirical evidence that Nussbaum has yet to supply. Therefore, we have reason to think that a 
proper account of anger will be able to make sense of anger in this obstacle overcoming role.  
2.2: Educational Anger 
Education anger is concerned with actions and character traits which are detrimental to 
our ability to pursue a flourishing life. If we are dishonest or simply judged as being so, we 
might limit our options in life. Anger’s role in such cases is either to educate others or to 
challenge ourselves to do better in the future. One example of such cases is if I start going to the 
gym with the goal of bench pressing 225 lbs in 20  months. Near the end of this time, if I am 
unable to lift this amount, I might become angry at myself. Especially if I believe that my ability 
to bench this amount was impeded by my own laziness.  
                                                          
6 Harmless, William, and Raymond R. Fitzgerald. “The Sapphire Light of the Mind: The Skemmata of 
Evagrius Ponticus.” Theological Studies, vol. 62, no. 3, 2001, pp. 498–529. 
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There are many historical accounts which detail anger’s use in cases of education. 
Evagrius Poticus and Augustine held that anger could be used as an educational tool (Gillette, 
2010)7. Jesus displayed anger in the temple as a way of showing discontent towards and/or 
educating the money lenders (Matthew 5:38)8. Similarly, Buddha used anger to chastise a 
follower who willfully misinterpreted him (Mahatanhasankhaya Sutta)9. In anger’s educational 
role it seems that we perceive ourselves or others as having some ‘bad’ character trait or having 
performed some wrong action. Insofar as we care about the others, and/or ourselves, we have 
reason to desire that they no longer perform such actions or have bad character traits.  Anger in 
education is aimed at well-being rather than retribution or suffering. Therefore, the Traditional 
Account seems ill-suited to handle such cases.  
Seneca provides a criticism of anger in educational with the story of how Plato 
disciplined his slaves (De Ira 3, 12). Plato refused to enact punishment himself because in his 
anger he believed that he might punish the man more than was necessary. Instead he asked 
another to enforce the punishment so that the slave might learn but not be harmed more than 
necessary. A similar story can be found in the works of Augustine in a letter he wrote to a 
Mother Felicitas who was having a dispute with some of the sisters at her convent (Gillette, 
2010). Mother Felicitas corrected some of the sisters angerly. Augustine admitted that while 
anger may accomplish the task; she must be careful not to react to strongly in anger. However, 
she should not apologize for the claims made less her position be undermined. The criticism of 
                                                          
7 Gillette, Gertrude. Four Faces of Anger: Seneca, Evagrius Ponticus, Cassian, and Augustine. University 
Press of America, 2010 
8 The Holy Bible: Containing the Old and New Testaments. Oxford University Press, 2002. 
9 Ñāṇamoli , and Bodhi. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: a Translation of the Majjhima 
Nikāya. Wisdom Publications, in Association with the Barre Center for Buddhist Studies, 2015. 
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anger at play here is the idea that even if it can perform an educational role, it tends to do so in a 
manner that is potentially immoral. 
 Nussbaum provides a possible alternative to the use of anger in such cases. Arguing that 
an appearance of anger can accomplish the same goal without the risk. She gives an account of 
the case of Jesus in the temple.  She argues that the Utku Eskimo provide a beneficial way of 
thinking about Jesus’ actions (43). The Utku seem to hold that Jesus’ actions in the temple were 
a performance to educate “without any emotion in the anger area”. She argues that such displays 
are “a possibility that is open to those who want to deter without risking going down the wrong 
path”. She comments on this further to point out the usefulness of performative anger even when 
actual anger is not present.  
“One Saturday my hair Stylist… reached up for the shampoo, opening a ill-organized cabinet out 
of which various bottles fell… I was startled but not really hurt or upset. But I thought it was 
useful to signal to others the significance of this event, since someone else could be seriously 
hurt in the future. So, I gave a display of polite outrage…” (150) 
Here Nussbaum shows that the performance of anger can be used as a tool for correction even if 
anger is not present. In Jesus’ case He is attempting to address the corruption that has invaded 
the temple, His Father’s house. Given this unique connection to the temple, it is not unreasonable 
to assume that Jesus was feeling genuine anger in this scenario. However, Nussbaum’s point that 
a performance of anger could accomplish the same goal is correct and worth addressing. If she is 




There is good empirical evidence to suggest that, even from the age of infancy, we 
naturally react and change our behavior in response to the emotion cues of others (Klinnert et al., 
1983, Tronick, 1989)10 . We use the emotional cues of others to make predictions about the types 
of behavior they are likely to engage in towards us. Someone trying to defend the Traditional 
Account might argue that in cases of education we are not actually angry. Instead we put on the 
performance of anger, perhaps subconsciously, to provide a threatening pose. However, if we do 
not see the need to defend the Traditional Account, then it seems reasonable to say we are angry 
in these cases. Perhaps it is a threat of violence on our part that changes the behavior in others. 
Perhaps in many cases the others simply realize they have made us upset and because they care 
of our opinion of them are willing to alter their behavior. Either way it is not clear that anger in 
education desires suffering and this is a problem for the traditional account; even if Seneca’s 
criticism holds. 
How can we make sense of Anger in the case of education? Perhaps we might adopt 
Shoemaker’s view that there are two types of anger and claim that anger in education is a case of 
obstacle overcoming anger. We see ‘educational’ flaws as obstacles on our way to accomplishing 
further goals and anger plays a role in motivating us to overcome these obstacles. However, a 
problem arises in the case of education as it involves an assignment of blame. On Shoemaker’s 
account, Goal-frustrating anger does not involve an assessment of another’s blameworthiness. 
Blaming Anger assigns blame but Shoemaker argues that its main goal to communicate our 
                                                          
10 Klinnert, Mary, et al. “EMOTIONS AS BEHAVIOR REGULATORS: SOCIAL REFERENCING IN 
INFANCY.” Emotions in Early Development, Academic Press, 1983, pp. 57–86. 
Tronick, Edward Z. “Emotions and Emotional Communication in Infants.” American Psychologist, vol. 44, 
no. 2, 1989, pp. 112–119. 
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anger towards those who have wronged us. I find this account of blaming anger quite appealing, 
however it is not clear this is what is happening in the educational case of anger.  
The goal in the educational expression of anger is not solely to express that we are angry, 
but to stop the negative behavior. Perhaps the expression of anger is a step towards this goal, but 
certainly we would find the expression of our anger meaningless if it did not accomplish what we 
desired. Also, in education, it need not be the case the that other has wronged me or anyone. For 
this reason, I doubt that Shoemaker is correct about there being two types of anger and I assume 
there is a single underlying account which can make sense of this overlap.  
2.3: Anger at Injustice 
 I have already mentioned that Nussbaum claims there are two traditional ways to view 
the harms involved in acts of injustice. Either as the tangible physical, psychological, and 
emotional harms (29) or as a down-ranking of societal status (28). She calls these two options the 
Road of Payback and the Road of Status. It is these two accounts which form the main criticism 
of anger’s ability to address injustice. 
The Road of Status treats injuries, not as the tangible damage done to individuals, but as 
down-rankings to their social status (28). Nussbaum attributes her account of the Road of Status 
to Jean Hampton (1988)11. On Hampton’s account, the worry involved in harm on the part of the 
victim is that the offense caused to them displays the victim’s weakness. By putting down the 
one who offended them, they prove them lesser/weaker and restore their relative social status 
(26). The problem with the status account is that it treats all harms, tangible or not, as they relate 
                                                          
11 Murphy, Jeffrie G., and Jean Hampton. Forgiveness and Mercy. Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
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to one’s self-esteem. To elaborate on the problem with the status account she focused on the case 
of rape.  
On the Status account, the harm of rape is that it places the victim’s status arbitrarily 
lower than the attackers. By punishing or humiliating the attacker, the victims of rape assert 
themselves to hold the higher relative position. Nussbaum is correct that a relegation of all harms 
to down-rankings is irrational. The harms involved in rape are not harms of down-ranking, at 
least not entirely, and lowering the others social status does not assuage them. Rape often 
involves physical harms, which are ill conceived in terms of down-ranking; to lose an eye is not 
to lose ‘face’ in society. Secondly, rape involves psychological and emotional trauma which may 
involve harms to one’s self-esteem, but also involves fears concerning one’s safety and impairs 
one’s ability to function properly in society. Such harms go beyond mere damages to self-
confidence. 
The Road of Payback views slighting as a tangible harm which it attempts to assuage via 
punishment. Nussbaum questions why any intelligent person would take this seriously as a way 
of addressing tangible injuries, such as physical harm (24). Certainly, we cannot think that 
punishing the other person restores what is damaged in cases of tangible injury. If I lose my eye, 
neither taking the eye of my offender or putting them in jail will restore my own. It is on this 
understanding of harm where the role of aesthetic pleasure comes into play. According to 
Nussbaum, Payback makes sense only if we adopt a questionable metaphysical account of 
punishment where justice requires a ‘balancing of cosmic scales’.  Punishment on this view is 
simply an irrational way of addressing the types of harms at play. It will simply not be the case 
that my pleasure at revenge plays any role in addressing the tangible harms we face in real world 
cases of injustice.  
13 
 
The Traditional Account of anger as a desire to respond to injustice through suffering is 
not completely irrational. There are cases of pure social status harms that can be addressed via 
retribution. Perhaps this is what Aristotle had in mind with his definition and by attempting to 
address the case of rape by the same means we are making a mistake. If someone calls me a liar, 
then I might desire for them to suffer. This is not irrational if the suffering has something to do 
with the claim they have made about me. If my accuser is held higher in social esteem than I, 
proving them a liar may harm them much more than their claims could ever harm me. However, 
causing them this harm is a rational way to respond to the harm that they caused me. It is not 
clear to me why Nussbaum does not separate these cases and treat them as different uses of 
anger. There is no need to assert that because anger deals with both status and payback our 
account must merge one into the other. Nor, that traditionally we have.  
I argue that the reason that anger is irrational in the Traditional Account is because it 
assumes anger has the same goal in all cases. It is unreasonable to assume that anger would seek 
the same outcome in cases A, B, and C; when these cases are focused on vastly different harms. 
However, we cannot ignore the cases where the Traditional Account is appropriate. What we 
need is an account of anger that makes sense of anger’s ability to play all these roles; especially 
in addressing tangible harms.  
 
Section 3: Impediment Anger 
In order to understand anger’s role in addressing injustice, I propose an alternative 
account of anger based upon anger’s ability to motivate us to overcome obstacles: Call this 
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Impediment Anger. Impediment Anger is a desire to overcome impediments to our general well-
being and goals and the well-being and goals of those we care about.  
I argue there are four fundamental types of impediments.  
1. Amoral impediments 
2. Character Impediments 
3. Appraisal Impediments 
4. Recognition Impediments 
 
3.1: Amoral and Character Impediments 
Amoral impediments are the impediments caused by amoral obstacles. We get angry at ice 
on our car windows because it is an impediment to our ability to pursue further goals. It is 
rational for us to take active steps to overcome such obstacles. One might argue that in these 
cases what we experience is not anger; granted the close association between anger and blame. 
However, it seems like we do get angry in such cases. When we get angry at ice on our 
windshields the body is priming itself to deal with an impediment to our ability to go about our 
day. Anger’s role in prompting action can be seen by the fact that anger causes various physical 
changes allowing us to react more quickly in response to obstacles (Levenson, Ekman, & 
Friesen, 1990)12. In these cases, the obstacle is largely an obstacle to our immediate goals. 
However, depending on the nature of these goals such obstacles may be an impediment to our 
                                                          
12  Levenson, Robert W., et al. “Voluntary Facial Action Generates Emotion-Specific Autonomic Nervous 
System Activity.” Psychophysiology, vol. 27, no. 4, 1990, pp. 363–384. 
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general well-being. My account of Impediment Anger is to take this role of anger and extend it to 
other cases.  
Character Impediments concern anger’s role in education. If in all cases anger is a desire to 
overcome impediments, then we can make sense of its role in education. In cases of education 
we recognize that one has impeded their own ability to succeed and live a flourishing life into the 
future. Or at the very least that their actions are not productive to their own immediate goals. 
Anger in these cases provides motivation for us or others to overcome these impediments. 
However, even as a desire to overcome an impediment we might still fall victim to Seneca’s 
concern. 
One way of looking at Plato’s reluctance to punish his slave is to say that anger is inefficient 
as an educational tool. We might worry that anger causes us to act against others above and 
beyond what is necessary in an educational setting. However, it is not clear why we should say 
that Plato asking another to perform the task of discipline is not also acting out of anger. To take 
an action out of anger is not to be non-pragmatic in trying to accomplish our goals. There is 
reason to believe that if we act to aggressively in our anger we will cause additional impediment 
to those we are trying to educate. However, this does not imply that we are no longer angry if we 
relegate the task to a more suited party.  
Understanding anger in this way may help us make sense of cases which fall between these 
two types of impediments. Two examples are when we get angry at young children and 
accidents. Nussbaum’s approach is to label these cases as irrational because young children are 
not moral agents and accidents are unintentional thus they cannot be rationally assigned blame 
(18). An interesting thing to note about Nussbaum’s denial of rationality, due to the lack of 
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intention on the part of the target, implies that there are cases where such anger is rational. Is it 
true that in every instance where we are angry because of children or accidents we are 
irrationally assigning blame? 
A child acting up in a store is an impediment to our ability to shop. Losing a leg in an 
accident is an impediment to one’s mobility. It is certainly the case that we might treat the actors 
in this case as full moral agents and thus act immorally towards them. However, we might also 
be angry at the situation they have caused and not the actors themselves. If we are careful to 
distinguish between cause and blameworthiness, it is unclear that our anger in such cases is 
morally problematic. If we value the goals we are trying to accomplish, then our expressions of 
anger in these cases are displays of frustration: Communications of our frustration to ourselves or 
others. Such communications are morally neutral; assuming we do not act towards the cause in 
these cases as we would full moral agents.  
If we desire to make sense of our anger in these cases, we cannot rely on the Traditional 
Account. We get angry in many circumstances where it does not seem we are desiring revenge. 
If Nussbaum is going to argue that our anger in these cases is irrational, then she needs to 
provide more evidence that we are desiring revenge in these cases. I hold that our desire is to 
overcome the impediments that our preventing us from accomplishing our goals. This account 
makes better sense of the issues at play in said cases. 
3.2: Appraisal Impediments 
 
    Appraisal and Recognition Impediments are based on Stephen Darwall’s (1997) account of 
respect. Darwall argued that that there are two fundamental types of respect: Recognition and 
17 
 
Appraisal. Recognition Respect is respect for persons as such: An assumption of general, basic 
human dignity which requires others to “take seriously and weigh appropriately the fact that they 
are persons in deliberating what to do”. On the other hand, Appraisal respect does not carry with 
it any necessary actions which must be taken towards an individual. It is instead recognition of 
an individual’s status in society, or recognition of their character. 
 Appraisal Impediments are impediments caused when one fails to recognize or 
intentionally lowers another’s social status. I have already addressed these cases briefly in my 
discussion of injustice. I argue that the best way to explain the role of retribution in these cases is 
as a tool for overcoming impediments.  
Imagine I am wrongly labeled a liar.  This false accusation has the potential to be an 
impediment towards attainment of my social goals. In such cases, we do not merely desire the 
other to suffer. Instead we desire to not be labeled a liar.  Causing the other to suffer can be a 
tool for that purpose. If he suffers because I prove him the liar then my primary goal has been 
accomplished, his suffering is a secondary effect of my primary goal of overcoming the appraisal 
impediment to the achievement of my social goals.  Imagine that my accuser gets into a minor 
wreck damaging the car he cares deeply about. This would cause him suffering but would do 
nothing to assuage the harms done to me. The desire for him to suffer because of his reduced 
social status in the former case is rational as it is a by-product of proving myself to be an honest 
man. Addressing social status harms through retribution only make sense if the reason to cause 
suffering somehow addresses the harms caused. 
There is an open question as to why we should care about social slights if they are not 
damaging enough to be tangible harms. I argue that the reason to care about the harms in 
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Appraisal Impediments is that if they are not addressed they may become Recognition 
Impediments; which are impediments to one’s overall well-being. For now, it is enough to say 
that even Nussbaum acknowledges that we can make sense of anger’s role in addressing 
Appraisal Impediments. I argue the reason this makes sense is because anger overall is a desire 
to overcome impediments, not a desire for suffering. Aristotle’s account of anger in 
Nicomachean Ethics13 (NE) gives us another way to think about why we should address these 
slights.  
The deficiency, whether it is a sort of 'inirascibility' or whatever it is, is blamed. For those 
who are not angry at the things they should be angry at are thought to be fools, and so are 
those who are not angry in the right way, at the right time, or with the right persons; for 
such a man is thought not to feel things nor to be pained by them, and, since he does not 
get angry, he is thought unlikely to defend himself; and to endure being insulted and put 
up with insult to one's friends is slavish. (NE. 4.5) 
For Aristotle anger is not always retaliatory but is instead about displaying that one has a 
certain type of moral character. That one is the kind of person who will defend themselves and 
those around them. This account only works if anger is not solely a desire for revenge: It is 
striking that Nussbaum does not discuss the account from Nichomachean Ethics, but instead 
focuses only on the relatively underdeveloped definition of anger given in the Rhetoric.  
Anger in this way is a desire to overcome impediments which if one does not overcome, 
or attempt to, they present themselves as slavish.  To be slavish is to be a person who cannot 
function fully as an agent in their interpersonal interactions.  
3.3: Recognition Impediments 
                                                          
13 “The Internet Classics Archive | Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle.” Translated by W D Ross, The Internet 
Classics Archive, classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.4.iv.html. 
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 Recognition Impediments are caused by an inability or unwillingness to recognize the 
personhood of others. Such impediments are best explained through an example. In her paper, 
Anger as a Political Emotion, Celine Leboeuf analyzes anger’s use as a response to be subjected 
to what she calls the ‘white gaze’. Essentially this is the recognition by a non-white American 
that they are being judged or assumed lesser based purely on the color of their skin. She paints 
anger as a reasonable response used to assert one’s personhood in such situations.  
In short, the black man’s anger endows him with an acuity that he had lost when he first 
entered the white world. No longer “disorient” and “unable to discover the feverish 
coordinates of the world,” The black man seeks to “assert [himself] as a BLACK MAN. 
(Leboeuf, 2017; 24)14 
In Leboeuf’s account of the African American man he is experiencing a Recognition 
Impediment. He feels disoriented because he is unable to act like himself within the ‘white 
world’. To reassert his personhood, he gets angry and confronts the other. It is not hard to 
imagine an individual in this case saying: ‘I could care less how you feel, I simply want you to 
recognize me for the person I am’. The story Leboeuf analyzes ends with the man claiming:  
“Her face covered in shame. At last I was freed from my rumination. I realized two things 
at once: I had identified the enemy and created a scandal. Overjoyed. We could now have 
some fun.” (Fanon, 2008)15 
In the expression that we can now have fun, the man shows that the impediment has been 
overcome and why he desired to overcome it. He is not trying to address the problems of racism 
to promote the greater good. Instead he is dismayed by the impediment this woman puts on him 
merely because of the color of his skin: An impediment that prevents him from acting as himself. 
His desire to overcome the impediment is a desire to assert his personhood and thus be able to 
                                                          
14 Leboeuf, Celine. “Anger as a Political Emotion.” The Moral Psychology of Anger, Rowman and Littlefield 
International, 2018, pp. 15–29. 
15 Fanon, Frantz “Black Skin, White Mask.” New York: Grove Press, 2008. 
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enter a lasting future relationship.  One may argue that he secretly desired the woman to suffer 
but such arguments ring hollow. The joy expressed by his reaction is not a joy at her suffering 
but at his overcoming of the impediment to his basic human dignity.  
Recognition Impediments are impediments to one’s basic human dignity.   While a 
detailed account of dignity is beyond the scope of this paper, we can rely, for our purposes here 
on Nussbaum’s (2006)16 account of human dignity. Her account treats human dignity as 
something intrinsic to all human beings; something that cannot be removed. However, it details 
ways that we might fail to recognize this status and thus cause harm or impediment. Nussbaum 
argues that imprisoning an innocent person harms them not because it removes dignity, but 
because it “deprives the person of the opportunity to exercise his or her good capacities”; such 
capacities being necessary to live a flourishing life. Recognition Impediments are caused when 
through one’s actions they take away the ability to lead a flourishing life. Leboeuf’s ‘black man’ 
faces an inability to exercise his good capacities because he is being unfairly judged/scrutinized. 
By causing the woman to feel shame he gets her to recognize what she has ignored; his human 
dignity. In this way the African American man is using anger in the same way as Aristotle 
purposed in NE. He is using it to show that he is a person who demands certain treatment and 
will not have his own goals undermined via the actions of others.  
In Labeouf’s case, there is an impediment based in what options the African American 
man sees as viable when he is being judged. However, it might be argued that no real injury has 
occurred in this case because, unlike the case of rape, there is no tangible harm we can easily 
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distinguish. However, I purpose that we see tangible harms in cases such as rape as part of a 
Recognition Impediment. Such an account was defended by Jefferie Murphy: 
One reason we so deeply resent moral injuries done to us is not simply that they hurt us in 
some tangible or sensible way; it is because such injuries are also messages – symbolic 
communications… Intentional wrongdoing insults us and attempts to degrade us – and 
thus involves a kind of injury that is not merely tangible and sensible. It is moral injury, 
and we care about such injuries. (Murphy & Hampton, 1988; 25) 
 
An account like this was also defended by Nussbaum herself:  
…we still believe that rape is a violation of a woman's dignity. Why? Rape violates the 
bodily, mental, and emotional life of a woman, affecting all her opportunities for 
development and functioning. Rape, we might say, does not remove or even damage 
dignity, but it violates it, being a type of treatment that inhibits the characteristic 
functioning of the dignified human being. (Nussbaum, 2006; online) 
 
In Anger and Forgiveness, Nussbaum comments on trying to develop an account of 
retribution based in human dignity as though it is a non-starter: “Rape can be seen, plausibly, as 
a dignitary injury, not as just an injury to bodily integrity… However, notice that equal dignity 
belongs to all, and is not a relative or competitive matter (27).” Dignity is unlike social status in 
that it cannot be removed. However, here, Nussbaum does not address the fact that it can be 
ignored, and that ignoring dignity causes harm. Dignity is not the type of thing we can restore, 
but we can address reasonably the harms in cases of Recognition Impediment and anger may 
play a role in this. 
There are multiple ways we can explain anger’s ability to address these impediments. 
First is that we might use anger to demand certain actions be taken against the offenders in these 
cases. In the case of rape, the victims loved one’s have every reason to demand that the victim be 
given the best support possible in overcoming their suffering. The victim has a right to demand 
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that medical or psychological treatment is paid by the offender. There is a demand we might 
make on the offender to pay for ‘emotional’ distress on the victim; which may be additional 
funds to help with any other unforeseen consequences of the act. Ultimately, for some,  the harm 
in rape may be overcome with time, but there are costs which are accrued that must be 
addressed. We can see punishment, motivated by anger, as a way of helping to address these 
harms which does not fall victim to the retributive mistake. There is nothing to be fully assuaged 
in cases of Recognition Impediments: However, there are harms caused by ignoring one’s 
dignity which must be addressed, and some forms of punishment can do this.  
I am certainly not suggesting that all harms can be addressed through the transfer of 
funds or that punishment should consist solely of fines. There are good reasons to punish 
criminals above and beyond the ways already mentioned. We put criminals in prison to keep 
them from causing future harm, we punish in order to reform offenders, we see strict punishment 
as a way of deterring other bad actors, etc. I am not denying the role these forms of punishment 
play in society. It may also help the victim of a crime or their family to know that the offender is 
in jail. The security provided by this knowledge is likely invaluable.  
I argue that the best way to interpret anger’s role in addressing these harms requires an 
appeal to David Shoemaker’s account of blaming anger. Shoemaker argues that in such anger we 
are not trying to make the other suffer but “to communicate the anger”. Shoemaker ask us to 
imagine a case where an offense has been committed to your child and out of revenge you post a 
compromising photo of the offender. The offender is not aware that you posted the photo but 
believes that it is a malfunction of his phone. Are we satisfied in such cases? Imagine instead that 
you do not cause such suffering but simply yell at the offender or punch him in the face. These 
latter actions more clearly express the fact we are angry at the individual. I agree with 
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Shoemaker that a message is being sent in these cases, but why are we trying to send this 
message in the first place? Claiming that all we want to do is express anger ignores certain moral 
considerations, but there also seems to be very little reason to do this unless it is accomplishing 
some other goal.  
Antti Kauppinen17 argues that the recognition of respect towards a person requires us to 
hold others to the same standard regarding their actions towards the recognized individual; 
punishment expresses our commitment to this standard. Insofar as we care for others and 
ourselves as person’, anger is necessary to express our disapproval towards the offender and 
affection towards the victim. This says nothing as to what the punishment should be, but merely 
that anger and desire for the offender to suffer in some way recognizes the personhood of those 
who have been wronged. Because of this we can say that a way anger helps overcome 
Recognition Impediments is to actively reaffirm to the victim their personhood.  
In Labeouf’s case the man seems to be sending the message that he is a person and as 
such the woman has a moral duty to recognize his dignity; his ability to exercise good capacities. 
In the rape case we might say that the message sent is something akin to the following: You the 
offender have ignored the dignity of your victim. As such you have some responsibility to ensure 
that the victim can overcome this harm. Just expressing our anger is a pointless act if we do not 
think it will accomplish the goal of overcoming impediments. I agree with Shoemaker that the 
role of our anger in these cases is expression of our frustration or displeasure at the impediments 
we face. In fact, this might be the role that anger plays in all four types of impediments. 
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However, this role has no value unless it can accomplish a further task of helping us overcome 
said impediments.  
By adopting the Aristotelian account in Nichomachean Ethics in addition to Shoemaker’s 
and Kauppinen’s accounts, we get an answer concerning what anger can accomplish in these 
cases. Anger provides a way of displaying one’s values; if we do not get angry we act slavishly 
in a way that displays our own failure to uphold what we claim to value.  
In addressing cases of injustice, I have argued that in anger we are sending the message 
that we value dignity in ourselves and others and we will not stand for others disrespecting this 
value. However, this is not enough we must also use these displays of anger to help those who 
have been impaired overcome these impediments to the highest extant possible. Anger used for 
these purposes is a rational way of addressing injustice and in some cases is praiseworthy.  
 
Section 4: The Moral Praiseworthiness of Anger 
At this point I think there is a reasonable question to be asked as to why we should adopt 
my view of Impediment Anger. If the most that Anger can accomplish in these cases is a display 
of our value for human dignity and an overcoming of certain impediments, certainly we could do 
this without anger. Nussbaum offers her own alternative to the Traditional Account of anger: 
Transition Anger.  
Transition Anger is anger that plays a motivating role in promoting the greater good (36). 
Anger, according to Nussbaum, can lead us to adopt an outraged stance towards immoral action 
Coupled with the belief that “something should be done about this...” For example, Martin 
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Luther King and Malcom X focused their anger towards creating a more just future for African 
Americans. Transition Anger does not suffer from Nussbaum’s criticism because it lacks the 
desire for ‘payback’ which plagues the Traditional Account. A similar account can be found in 
Tantric Buddhism. The Tantric account of anger is that it can be used as a type of energy one 
harnesses to take future actions towards the good (McRae, 2018)18. Transition Anger can address 
the harms of rape by adopting a general focus on promoting the greater good of everyone 
involved. It desires that the victim of rape overcome the harms as much as possible and even that 
the offender goes on to live a good life. 
Nussbaum herself questions whether Transition Anger is actually a form of anger but 
dismisses the problem as unimportant (36). Nussbaum is looking for an emotion which can 
address injustice without desiring retribution; whether this emotion fails to be anger is not 
relevant to her goal. However, whether the emotion counts as anger is essential to answering the 
question I raised at the beginning of this paper: Is anger a morally praiseworthy response to 
injustice? If Transition Anger is not anger, then Nussbaum’s answer to my question remains 
‘no’. 
I argue that Transition Anger is more akin to the characterizations of the  emotion of 
Karuna (compassion) in the Buddhist tradition. On the Buddhist account it is our view of the self 
as distinct from others and requiring the address of insult that leads us to anger (Tangpa, 2006)19. 
The goal of compassion is to shift from focus on one’s own well-being towards the well-being of 
                                                          
18  McRae, Emily. “Anger and the Oppressed.” The Moral Psychology of Anger, Rowman and Littlefield 
International, 2018, pp. 105–121. 
19  Tangpa, Geshe. Eight Verses for Training the Mind: an Oral Teaching. Translated by Sonam Rinchen and 
Ruth Sonam, Snow Lion Publications, 2006. 
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others (Huebner, 2017)20. Nussbaum describes Transition Anger in a very similar manner: “So 
anger (if we understand it to involve, internally, a wish for retributive suffering) quickly puts 
itself out of business, in that even the residual focus on punishing the offender is soon seen as 
part of a set of projects for improving both offenders and society… It looks more like 
compassionate hope (31). Transition Anger is not concerned with overcoming impediments, but 
instead concerned with stopping such harms from happening in the future. Given anger’s 
supposed propensity towards irrationality or violence, why should we not give up our anger and 
adopt this emotion of compassion? 
Nussbaum’s overall argument against anger can be framed as the following: The Stoics 
were correct in their analysis of anger as irrational, therefore we ought to adopt the Buddhist 
alternative. This opens my account up to another set of objections which parallel the concern of 
Plato disciplining his slave. If there is a viable alternative to anger which does not risk going to 
the extreme in cases of punishment, but still accomplishes the same task, should we not strive to 
adopt this account. To show what is misguided in this objection, I will focus on the real-world 
case of Brock Turner21 
What does it say about us as individuals if we do not get angry towards certain cases of 
injustice? Turner was caught sexual assaulting his victim behind a dumpster at a party. If I am 
correct and anger is a desire to overcome impediments to ourselves or ones we care for, then to 
not display anger may be a failure to recognize the harm committed to the victim or a failure to 
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International, 2018, pp. 89–104. 
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recognize and care for the victim’s personhood. However, we can address the impediments 
caused in rape through compassion. Compassion motivates punishment solely in order to help 
victims overcome the harms committed to them and it would thus seem appropriate to use 
compassion to accomplish the same ends as anger. Why then should we risk anger and the 
possibility of giving into the desire for irrational retribution? 
It has been argued that anger, if not addressed, risks turning into hatred towards the 
offender (Gillette, 2010; Hampton & Murphy, 1982). Hatred is no longer recognizable as a 
desire to overcome impediments but instead it is a hostility towards the offender above and 
beyond what is necessary to address the harms committed. The reason for this is that anger when 
ignored feeds upon itself using the imagination. Not only do we see offenders as immoral we 
fixate on the harms they caused us and imagine them to be worse than they are. Let’s apply this 
to the case of Brock Turner. There is no doubt that Turner, being caught in the act, was guilty of 
the crime of sexual assault. What punishment would be too much punishment in his case? Might 
we go to the extreme and recommend the death penalty? Perhaps this is too harsh; maybe 
chemical castration is enough? A person who finds themselves in a state of hatred might find 
themselves having such thoughts. Why does this hatred, this desire for retribution, occur in 
conjunction with anger in the first place? 
I argue that this hatred occurs because anger starts from the position of fully recognizing 
Turner’s human dignity; that Turner has the ability and right to exercise his good capacities. In 
our anger towards Turner we treat him as a full moral agent who committed a wrong act and 
must make amends; demonstrated by the close association of anger and the assertion of 
blameworthiness (Quigley and Tedeschi, 1996). This may cause us to see Turner as worse and 
worse until we feel that amends have been made, but this is just an unfortunate effect of us 
28 
 
expecting Turner to treat others with respect; despite the fact he may refuse to do so. Once an 
offender like Turner takes the steps to make amends our anger is often assuaged and does not 
affect our future analysis of his actions (Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock, 1999)22. To properly 
view the moral landscape that surrounds Turner’s case, we must be willing to see him as an 
agent, to get angry, and to respect the fact that he is also person with dignity. This gives Turner 
the chance to make amends but also risks turning him into a monster in our minds. I argue there 
is a fine balance at play in cases like these.  What happens, for example if we go too far in the 
opposite direction and embrace the attitude of compassion, or transition anger towards Turner? 
Compassion or Transition Anger is not focused on respecting personhood. Instead it is 
focused on addressing the underlying causes that lead to the impediment. As such, I argue that 
compassion cannot properly respect Turner’s personhood. Compassion treats him as a victim of 
environment, fate, or bad luck. Turner for whatever reasons, many outside of his control, is the 
type of person capable of performing heinous actions. Through compassion we assume that there 
were underlying factors at play in his choices; the question is where do these underlying factors 
end? Compassion can address this concern by making the following claim: Prior circumstances, 
emotional states, mental states, etc. surrounding our actions influence and limit the choices that 
make themselves appear viable to us. In this way Brock did make a choice and could have 
chosen differently, but he did not fully understand the wrongness of his actions. 
I chose to focus on Turner’s case because of a letter his father, Dan Turner, sent to the 
Judge presiding over his son’s trial: 
                                                          
22  Goldberg, Julie H., et al. “Rage and Reason: the Psychology of the Intuitive Prosecutor.” European 
Journal of Social Psychology, vol. 29, no. 56, 1999, pp. 781–795. 
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“What we didn’t realize was the extent to which Brock was struggling being so far from 
home… When Brock was home during the Christmas break, he broke down and told us how 
much he was struggling to fit in socially. “In hindsight, it’s clear that Brock was desperately 
trying to fit in at Stanford and fell into the culture of alcohol consumption and partying,” Dan 
Turner concluded. “This culture was modeled by many of the upperclassmen on the swim team 
and played a role in the events of Jan 17th and 18th 2015.” 
 
Dan Turner’s letter expresses a denial of his son’s moral agency. It is not his son’s fault 
that he committed this crime. Instead it is the fault of the circumstances: a reference to the idea 
that there but for the grace of God go we. It is difficult not to sympathize with a father asking for 
mercy in the case of his son. However, the attitude or position that a parent takes towards their 
child’s wrong-doing, compared to the public, may involve infantilization to an extent. However, 
just as we would not want an angry man to be a judge; we would not want a father to judge his 
own son. A father of the accused cannot judge his own son because his partiality blinds him to 
the larger moral picture. I argue that Dan Turner’s letter is an example of the concern of hatred 
turned in the opposite direction; a view that infantilizes others to the point that they no longer 
have any moral agency. Compassion without anger tends to move in this direction also. 
To respect Turner’s personhood, we cannot excuse away the choices that Turner made. 
We must recognize that Turner may be a full moral agent aware of his actions who made the 
conscious choice to ignore another’s personhood. It is not clear to me that compassion can take 
this stance. That is not to say we should ignore the underlying causes, but to keep his personhood 
in mind. In order to understand the moral duty we might have in regards to Turner I appeal once 
again to the account of Dignity by Antti Kauppinen who argues: 
“Respect requires that… I’m willing to hold you accountable, circumstances permitting. If we 
continue to interact, I must show my anger and resentment, and make it clear I expect you to 
cease and desist and repent if you are to be forgiven. In doing so, I show that I have faith in your 
ability to recognize and respond to the rational authority of my will.” (Kauppinen, 2018; 37) 
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He continues this train of thought by arguing that if we are the ones who commit the wrong and 
fail to acknowledge the other’s anger we continue to disrespect them, to not recognize their 
will/autonomy.  
Following Kauppinen’s insight, I offer up a thought experiment. Imagine that I have been 
robbed by a friend, thus experiencing a Recognition Impediment. I choose not to confront my 
friend, but to simply end the friendship and no longer talk to them. Years later I still choose to 
avoid a relationship with the friend, if they try to contact me. It seems I have not given my friend 
a chance to make amends. By confronting my friend, and giving them the opportunity to feel 
shame, I would have respected their personhood and left open the option of a future relationship. 
Anger in this case is not only morally acceptable but I argue morally praiseworthy compared to 
the stance of Compassion. If Compassion cannot account for Turner’s personhood, then we have 
reason to question whether it accurately represents what we should be concerned about in such 
cases. We commit an immoral act ourselves if we ignore Turner’s dignity in the same way he 
ignored the dignity of others. By expressing anger, we give Turner the chance to change and by 
offering him this chance we may be doing something above and beyond the call of moral duty in 
most cases. For example, imagine that a random man on the street yells something racist at you. 
Do you have a responsibility to give him the chance to repent for this insult? 
When a random person yells at you on the street we might argue that he intentionally 
chose to disregard your human dignity. It is not clear that sending a message to the offenders in 
these cases is useful. The reason we might find giving Turner the chance to repent praiseworthy 
is that he may not have been intentionally choosing to ignore his victim’s dignity. In cases of 
racism the dismissal of another’s personhood is evident. However, we can imagine that Turner 
was simply so self-centered that he did not consider the harms he might be doing to others. In 
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such cases giving Turner the chance to repent might be a praiseworthy way to confront the 
situation. To express to him that we respect his dignity but disrespect the choices that he made 
with it.  
Turner might not repent for his crime, and if he does not, we might see him as a monster. 
However, by giving him the chance to repent we give him the chance to realize he made a bad 
choice, this act itself might be praiseworthy. The cases where it is appropriate to respond to in 
anger will once again become a pragmatic question. However, it does not seem irrational that in 
some cases we should grant the other a chance to make amends and treat them as full agents. 
Doing so displays our own commitment to the value of dignity.  
In addition, we should also question the idea of ‘there but for the grace of God go I’ that 
seems to be a part of the emotion of compassion. The thought that the only reason I am not 
Turner is that I did not find myself in his circumstances. What does it say about our own 
character if we can sympathize with people like Turner? Certainly, there have been others in 
similar circumstances who did not cause the same harms. 
There is a reasonable concern that our capacity to have sympathy for others depends on 
our ability to relate to them. Myisha Cherry argues an account like this in her paper ‘The Errors 
and Limitations of our “Anger-Evaluating” ways’. She imagines a white male who is a blue-
collar worker in a small midwestern town.  This man sees a news story about an urban African 
American man protesting racial discrimination. Unable to relate to the African American man’s 
anger, the white worker asserts that the man is too angry and that his anger will likely not 
accomplish the change he desires. The same white worker sees a story about other white workers 
in a midwestern town who are protesting being laid off. He understands what it is like to be a 
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white employee whose boss might treat him unjustly and therefore sees their anger as rational. 
Cherry’s point with these examples is to highlight the fact that sympathizing with someone 
requires the ability to see ourselves in their shoes: That there are epistemic limitations on our 
ability to relate to others. The worry for me is that having only compassion towards Turner may 
require us to be able to see ourselves in his shoes. Anger may be an expression of a praiseworthy 
character in this case as it displays our lack of sympathy for Turner’s choices.  
Nussbaum’s Transition Anger or Compassion are certainly praiseworthy emotions. They 
are both desires to produce a better future for everyone involved in cases of wrongful harm. 
However, these emotions cannot take the proper stance one should have concerning people like 
Turner. I also do not want to ignore the fact that anger can lead us to resentment. The proper 
stance to take likely lies somewhere between these two emotions. To properly view the moral 
landscape and to care for others as persons we must have anger. However, to not treat others as 
monsters we must be willing to understand why the options they chose seemed viable to them at 
the time. The overarching criticism I have of Nussbaum is that she attempts to form an anger 
which is not victim to moral flaws. Such an anger is a skewed way of viewing the moral 
landscape and does not respect human dignity. Anger is demonstrative of a praiseworthy and 
rational character when it is done pragmatically, with a focus on the future good, and attempts to 
respect the dignity of all involved. If we are lacking anger, then we are lacking the ability to act 





In this paper, I have argued that anger is not only rational, but in some cases is morally 
praiseworthy. I have done this by arguing that the Traditional Account cannot make sense of 
anger’s role in many cases where we assume it is rational. Afterwards, I provided my own 
account of anger that can make sense of its role in addressing amoral targets, in education, and in 
addressing injustice. In doing show I have defended against the Stoic claims of irrationality and 
the Buddhist claims that anger promotes an immoral character. 
 The reason for anger’s moral praiseworthiness is that it seeks the future good for people 
who face impediments in a way capable of respecting the basic dignity of all involved. I believe 
that if we get rid of anger, then we lose something crucial for navigating the moral framework. 
Maybe it is as Aristotle argued in the Nichomachean Ethics that we become somehow slavish 
and unable to respect ourselves or those we care for. Even more than that we find ourselves 
unable to respond to those who wrong us as agents. If we believe that personhood or dignity 
must be respected in everyone, then we must be willing to get angry. Value and anger go hand in 
hand when addressing impediments and we lose the ability to value dignity in ourselves and 
others when we lose anger.  
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